I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,' the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who was abducted from Mexico in order to be tried for an alleged crime cannot prevent United States courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over him, even though the United States has an extradition treaty with Mexico and the abduction was conducted under the authority of United States government officials. This Note examines the opinions of Alvarez-Machain and concludes that the case was wrongly decided; the Court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. This Note explains that the majority erred in failing to distinguish this case from Ker v. Illinois, 2 in which the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction could be exercised over a defendant who was abducted by an official acting only under his personal authority. This Note also argues that given the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico 3 -including the Treaty's purposes, detailed provisions of the Treaty providing for exceptions to extradition requirements, the history of Mexico's understanding of the Treaty, and the background of international law in general-official abductions are implicitly prohibited. Given Supreme Court precedents preventing jurisdiction in the context of treaty violations, the United States government's violation of the Treaty should have prohibited personal jurisdiction. Finally, this Note suggests that the Alvarez-Machain opinion sends an ominous message to treaty partners that in the event that the United States carries out its treaties in bad faith, the nation's highest court may sanction such actions.
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, 2 6 ChiefJustice Rehnquist began by explaining the precedents of Ker v. scher. 28 In Ker, the defendant Frederick Ker was brought to trial on larceny charges in Illinois after being abducted from Peru, a country with which the United States had an extradition treaty. 29 The abduction in Ker was carried out by a United States agent acting in his individual, rather than official, capacity. 3 0 The Court in Ker held that, since abductions were not specifically prohibited by the treaty, the treaty was not called into question by the abduction; the treaty thereby did not prevent the United States courts from obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 31 In contrast, the Court in Rauscher held that even though the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty between the United States and Great Britain did not explicitly prohibit it, the "manifest scope and object of the treaty" 3 2 mandated that after a defendant was extradited for a specified offense, the United States courts could not try him for a different offense. 3 3 In essence, the Court in Rauscher held that trying a defendant in the face of a treaty violation, in and of itself, precluded United States court jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that Ker and Rauscher address two separate types of incidents: Ker for forcible abductions from other countries, and Rauscher for claimed violations of treaties. Thus, according to the majority, without a treaty violation, as in Rauscher, the holding of Rauscher was not applicable, and Ker was the the charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain, claiming the evidence against him was merely based on "hunches" and the "wildest speculation." Seth Mydans,Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 Ct. , 2191 Ct. (1992 .
34 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191.
controlling case.a 5 In trying to show that Ker was, in fact, the controlling case, ChiefJustice Rehnquist de-emphasized the importance of the two main differences between the Alvarez-Machain case and Ker. First, unlike the abduction of Alvarez-Machain, the Ker abduction was not officially sponsored by the United States government. Second, the Peruvian government did not protest the abduction in Ker, as the Mexican government had done in Alvarez-Machain.
6
After establishing an analogy between the instant case and Ker, the Court then proceeded to interpret the 1978 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico, 3 7 first looking at the plain terms of the Treaty. 3 8 The Court's purpose in interpreting the Treaty was to determine whether or not it prohibited abductions. If it did, then Rauscher would prohibit United States court jurisdiction in the face of a treaty violation. If it did not prohibit abductions, Rauscher would not be applicable, and jurisdiction could properly be asserted. The majority noted that the Treaty made no explicit mention of abductions, 3 9 and then proceeded to show that the Treaty also did not implicitly forbid abductions. 40 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the specific provisions of the Treaty were not meant to be exclusive, but merely constituted one means by which both of the countries could gain custody of someone in the other country for the purpose of criminal prosecution.
41
The Court continued its analysis of the Treaty by examining the history of negotiations and practices under the Treaty. 42 
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ABDUCTIONS
The majority continued its analysis of the implied provisions of the Treaty with an analysis of the Treaty's background in light of customary international law. 4 6 Here, the majority claimed that the argument put forth by Dr. Alvarez-Machain was logically inconsistent in that it distinguished Ker by saying no formal protest was made there by the Peruvian government, while at the same time, the argument of Dr. Alvarez-Machain claimed that the Treaty was selfexecuting and had the force of law. 4 7 If the latter were in fact true, the majority claimed, then the courts could enforce the Treaty without any formal protest. 4 8 More importantly, the majority continued, the dissent sought to read general principles of international law into a specific treaty, while in Rauscher, the Court merely looked at international law specifically relating to extradition treaties. 4 9 Extrapolating on the dissent's reasoning, the majority concluded that, in light of the general principle of international law against asserting one nation's police power in the sovereign territory of another nation, extradition treaties would be held to prevent the waging of war in another country. 50 Because such a conclusion would be absurd, the majority held that, even if the Alvarez-Machain abduction was "shocking" 5 1 and a violation of the general principles of international law, the decision of whether to repatriate the defendant was a matter outside of the Treaty and should be left to the Executive Branch. 5 2 As the Treaty was not violated in this case, Rauscher should not apply. In accordance with Ker, the majority held that the United States courts have personal jurisdiction over the respondent.
53

B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens 54 attempted to demonstrate how the Extradition Treaty was, in fact, violated by the abduction, and thus Rauscher applied to this case, rather than Ker. 55 He began by construing the Treaty itself which, in contrast to the majority, he said was meant to be all-inclusive on the subject of ex- tradition, given the totality of the Treaty's extradition provisions. 5 6 In looking to the parties' expectations when making the Treaty, Justice Stevens noted that the drafters of the Treaty would not have imagined that the Treaty allowed abductions, given its stated purpose of fostering cooperation and mutual assistance. 57 The extensive exceptions in the Treaty for when extradition is not appropriate "would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply kidnap the person." s 5 8 Taking the majority's reasoning to an extreme, the dissent said the majority would claim that it was permissible under the Treaty to simply torture or execute the suspect in the other country, in the name of expedience, given that such an act was not explicitly prohibited by the Treaty. 59 Clearly, the dissenting opinion argued, the basic scope and object of the Treaty "plainly imply a mutual understanding to respect the territorial integrity of the other contracting party." 60 Justice Stevens then attempted to demonstrate how the grounds for denying jurisdiction in this case were far more compelling than the grounds upon which jurisdiction in Rauscher was denied. 6 ' Justice Stevens argued that the Alvarez-Machain case constituted an even clearer instance of a treaty violation than Rauscher. To begin with, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in Rauscher was "far less comprehensive" than the Extradition Treaty in AlvarezMachain. 6 2 In addition, the cases cited by Rauscher in support of the doctrine of specialty 63 were not nearly as prevalent as those condemning violations of territorial integrity of friendly neighbors cited in the instant case. 64 Finally, the legal background cited by Rauscher for the doctrine of specialty was also "far less clear" than the authorities forbidding violations of the territorial integrity of a partner 56 Specifically, Justice Stevens stated:
From the preamble, through the description of the parties' obligations with respect to offenses committed within as well as beyond the territory of a requesting party, the delineation of the procedures and evidentiary requirements for extradition, the special provisions for political offenses and capital punishment, and other details, the Treaty appears to have been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition. Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting) .
57 Id. at 2198 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting Similarly, Justice Stevens pointed out that the proposal of scholars, cited by the majority, 7 1 to include language in extradition treaties explicitly prohibiting abductions, dealt only with cases analogous to Ker, in which the abductions were performed by private persons.
72
Finally, the dissenting opinion concluded that despite the understandable desire of the Executive Branch to bring an alleged accomplice to the murder of a federal agent to justice, this "provides no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has a duty to uphold." 73 Justice Stevens stated that when the public desire for revenge is strong, as it is here, it becomes increasingly important for the Court to provide its judgment dispassionately. 74 Ultimately, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are read by courts around the world as a source of guidance. Justice Stevens believed that presumably "most courts throughout the civi-65 Id at 2202-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) . Demonstrating the clarity of the legal background prohibiting violations of territorial integrity of extradition treaty partners, Justice Stevens quoted the Restatement of Foreign Relations, which illustrates this principle. Id. at 2202 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-EIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNrTED STATES § 432(2) & cmt. c (1987), which states that international law demands the repatriation of a person abducted by a state's law enforcement officials from the territory of a second country without the second country's consent).
66 Id. at 2203-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 67 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) On previous occasions, the Supreme Court itself has indicated that Ker is to be read only in a limited fashion. 8 2 In two cases involving government seizures in international waters of vessels engaged in transportation of alcohol allegedly in violation of the National Prohibition Act and the Tariff Act, the Court chose not to rely on Ker since, unlike in Ker, there were treaty violations. The Court in these two cases noted that the ability of the courts to adjudicate over seizures of property was directly affected if the seizures occurred in 75 Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting In seeming contradiction of a limited reading of Ker, ChiefJustice Rehnquist relied on the widely cited statement of Frisbie v. Collins,85 which read Ker as standing for the proposition that "the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' "86 However, because much of the remainder of the Court's opinion focused on whether or not the United StatesMexico Extradition Treaty was violated in this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist implicitly recognized that Frisbie's broad reading of Ker was, in fact, inaccurate. To read Ker this broadly would make it inconsistent with Rauscher, 8 7 a case in which the method by which a defendant was brought before a United States court did affect the court's jurisdiction over him. Particularly in light of the fact that Ker and Rauscher were handed down by the Supreme Court on the same day, it seems certain that the two cases were meant to be consistent with one another. Thus, a limited reading of Ker is in order.
Despite the Court's sensible reading of the limited scope of Ker, its reliance on Ker for the proposition that extradition treaties do not implicitly prohibit any abductions was flawed. The majority struggled to compare the facts of Ker to those of the instant case in an attempt to downplay the differences between the two cases.
88
The Court noted in passing that " [t] and the present case are that Ker was decided on the premise that there was no governmental involvement in the abduction, and the country of Peru, from which Ker was abducted, did not object to his prosecution." 89 These "only differences," are crucial, however, and ultimately should have led to a contrary holding in this case. The key distinction between this case and Ker is that the abduction in Ker was not, as here, authorized by the government. In holding that the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru was not violated by the abduction, the Court in Ker explicitly stated that "the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretense of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States." 90 The fact that the Court in Ker considered the absence of government involvement crucial to its holding that the extradition treaty was not violated, strongly suggests that its holding in Ker would have been otherwise if, as in Alvarez-Machain, there were government sponsorship.
An official sanction of an abduction in the territory of a treaty partner flagrantly violates the spirit of an extradition treaty. In the context of general international law, 9 ' the fact that an abduction is officially sponsored is a crucial ingredient of its illegality. 9 2 As one commentator articulated, " [t] he rule [of international law against abductions] presupposes that the abduction is carried out by agents instructed or authorized by the State, or by private volunteers whose acts have been adopted or ratified by the State." 9 3
Essentially, in an official abduction, the government exceeds the limits upon its own powers that were self-imposed by signing an extradition treaty. Once again, Cook and its discussion of government seizures of vessels during prohibition is enlightening. As Justice Brandeis declared in that case, " [t] he objection is that the government itself lacked the power to seize, since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority." 9 4 Similarly, in this case, the government, by the Extradition Treaty with Mexico, imposed limits on its own power. These limitations are evidenced by the many restrictions the Treaty places on extraditions, which 95 The United States exceeded these limits by officially sponsoring the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. This official sponsorship is quite different from an abduction by a private party who has not agreed to comply with such limits. Thus, the fact that there was an officially sponsored abduction in this case but not in Ker is, contrary to the majority's contention, a crucial distinction. 9 6 Additionally, the fact that there was no protest by the Peruvian government in Ker distinguishes Alvarez-Machain, a point the majority chose to de-emphasize. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Verdugo I a protest by the offended nation is necessary to constitute a treaty violation as "extradition treaties are principally designed to further the sovereign interests of nations, and therefore any rights they confer on individuals are derivative of the rights of nations." 98 As no violation of territorial sovereignty has occurred if a nation has consented to an action in its own territory, 99 a protest serves the necessary evidentiary function of showing that the offended nation did not consent to the abduction. Given the holding in United States v. Rauscher,1 0 4 if the abduction constituted a violation of the Treaty, jurisdiction would not be permitted. To reach its holding that the Treaty did not prohibit official abductions, the majority provided a strained reading of the Treaty and violated accepted norms of treaty interpretation by elevating the importance of the explicit terms of the Treaty, despite its ambiguity, above its purpose and history. The majority also read the Treaty largely outside the context of the norms of international law.
The Terms of the Treaty
In terms of the explicit language used in the Treaty, the majority was technically correct that the "Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if such an abduction occurs."' 0 5 There are, in fact, no explicit references to abductions in the Treaty.
However, the majority overemphasized the significance of this omission. The majority went so far as to misrepresent the standard method of treaty interpretation spelled out by the Court's earlier case, Air France v. Saks.'°r Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Air France for the proposition that "[i]n construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning."' 1 7 Actually, the Air France opinion said that treaty "analysis must begin... with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used."' 10 8 Thus, the absence of any explicit prohibition on abductions in the Treaty is less significant than the majority represented, if the context of the Treaty demonstrates otherwise.
The majority summarily dismissed the reasoning of the lower court that the Extradition Treaty provided the mandatory procedures through which the two countries had to act, in order to obtain jurisdiction over alleged criminals in the other country. 1 0 9 Given the strong case to be made for the lower court's reading of the Treaty, this interpretation of the Treaty warranted closer attention by the majority opinion. 111 E.g., Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2, 31 U.S.T. at 5062-63 (only certain types of offenses are extraditable); art. 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5063 (minimum amount of evidence required for extradition); art. 5, 31 U.S.T. at 5063-64 (no extradition for political or military offenses); art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 5064 (no extradition when person sought was already prosecuted or tried and convicted or acquitted by requested party for the claimed offense); art. 7, 31 U.S.T. at 5064-65 (cannot extradite when barred by lapse of 9 of the Treaty affords the requested nation the option of whether or not to extradite its own citizens, but requires that the requested nation try them in its own courts if it refuses extradition. 12 Viewed in this context, the Treaty makes little sense unless it is understood as prohibiting abductions." l 3 If one party to the Treaty could simply abduct persons from the Treaty partner's territory, the exceptions would be superfluous. Thus, the Treaty should be read to affirmatively place limits on the powers of the contracting nations to abduct persons from the territory of the treaty partner.
This said, given the rule of specialty, 1 4 governments would have an incentive to abduct rather than extradite if extradition treaties did not prohibit abductions." i 5 The abducting country would have substantially greater flexibility in trying a defendant if he were abducted, because the country would not be subject to the doctrine of specialty. Therefore, abductions would be more expedient than formal extradition. However, such encouragement of abduction over extradition is a far cry from the Extradition Treaty's stated purpose: "[T]o cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition."116 time); art. 8, 31 U.S.T. at 5065 (restrictions on extradition when offense is punishable by death in requesting nation but not in requested nation); art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065 (extradition of nationals of requested party is discretionary); art. 10, 31 U.S.T. at 5066-68 (required procedures for extradition); art. 17, 31 U.S.T. at 5071-72 (rule of specialty).
112 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065. 429-30 (1886) (holding that the doctrine of specialty is implicitly included in extradition treaties).
As discussed supra note 33 and accompanying text, the doctrine of specialty is the requirement that the country requesting extradition only try the extradited person for the offenses stated in the extradition request.
115 The author of a leading treatise on the laws of extradition noted the general incentive problem that occurs if nations are allowed to try defendants officially abducted from other nations, stating that " [t] o place states in a position where they can benefit from these practices encourages further violations and erodes voluntary observance of international law, whether by states or by individuals." BASSIOUNI, supra note 79, ch. 5, § 1, at 190.
116 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
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OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ABDUCTIONS
Even assuming that the Treaty could be interpreted as not prohibiting abductions, such a reading would violate the accepted canon of treaty construction that treaties should be liberally construed. 1 1 7 As the Court announced previously, "In choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed controlling in the interpretation of international agreements."'l 8 In the case of the Extradition Treaty with Mexico, a narrow and restricted construction is advanced by the AlvarezMachain majority: to permit official abductions because they are not explicitly prohibited. However, this reading blatantly thwarts the Treaty's purpose of fostering cooperation between the two nations in the rendition of criminals.' 1 9 As in other areas of treaty interpretation, such a narrow construction should be rejected in favor of a reading that is consistent with the purpose of the treaty.
The History of Negotiation and Practice Under the Treaty
In evaluating the history of negotiation and practice 20 under the Treaty, the majority once again neglected to make the crucial distinction between official government abductions and private ones. 1 21 Thus, the Court erred. It provided two invalid examples for the proposition that Mexico was forewarned that abductions were not implicit violations of extradition treaties, yet Mexico refrained from demanding that the Treaty explicitly include a prohibition on abductions. 
. ).
See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 79, ch. 2, § 4.3, at 82 ("Negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspondence are an integral part of th[e] surrounding circumstances, and [are] often relied on by courts in ascertaining the intentions of the parties.") (citation omitted).
121 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 Ct. , 2194 Ct. -95 (1992 . For a discussion of the significance of the distinction between official and non-official abductions, see supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 122 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2204-05 (Stevens. J., dissenting) (noting that both examples advanced by the majority for the proposition that Mexico was forewarned involved private abductions rather than, as in this case, official abductions). be inserted into the Treaty explicitly prohibiting abductions. 123 To support this proposition, footnote 11 of the Alvarez-Machain opinion discussed the 1905 Martinez incident, in which a Mexican national was abducted from Mexico and brought to the United States.
24
United States Secretary of State Blaine, however, informed Mexico that Ker allowed the United States to have jurisdiction over Martinez despite the Extradition Treaty.1 2 5 Footnote 11, however, failed to mention that Martinez's abduction, unlike that of Dr. AlvarezMachain, was not officially authorized by United States officials.' 26 Thus, in reality, Mexico was never given notice that the Treaty did not prohibit official abductions.
Similarly, the proposal of legal scholars cited by the majority 27 to add an article to extradition treaties prohibiting jurisdiction over abducted defendants made no mention of officially sponsored abductions. 28 In the comment adjoining the proposed article, the scholars clearly stated that the article was meant as a rejection of Ker. 129 As Ker is not analogous to the official abduction that took place in this case, by implication the proposed article is also not directly on point, and therefore cannot be used to show that Mexico chose not to have the Treaty prohibit official abductions. It would be truly ironic if the attempt by these scholars to broaden the respect for international law' 3 0 were used, as the majority attempted, to support the breach of a basic tenet of international law-that official abductions violate the territorial sovereignty 123 Id. at 2194. 124 Id. at 2194 n.ll (citing LETTER OF ROBERT BACON TO MEXICAN CHARGE, JUNE 22, 1906 , H.R. Doc. No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1121 -22 (1909 [hereinafter Bacon Letter] ).
125 Id.
126
The Bacon letter spoke of Ker as holding that extradition treaties do not guarantee rights of asylum to fugitives. Bacon Letter, supra note 124, at 1122. In the case of official abductions, as in Alvarez-Machain, however, the objection raised by the respondent is not that he was denied a right to asylum guaranteed by the Treaty, but that the United States violated an affirmative limit it placed on its power by the Treaty.
127 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194. 128 See Harvard Research, supra note 44, at 623. The proposed article reads in its entirety:
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such measures. In sum, the sources used by the majority in attempting to show that the Mexican government was on notice that abductions did not prevent United States courts from asserting personal jurisdiction over the kidnapped defendant are misplaced, as they are not applicable to officially sponsored abductions. On the contrary, the Mexican government relied on the statements of well-placed United States government officials to the effect that these abductions were, in fact, prohibited by the Treaty. Apparently, the Mexican government's belief that the Treaty prohibited official abductions was wellfounded. 143 
The Backdrop of Customary International Law
The majority held that there is no implied prohibition on abductions in the Extradition Treaty based on an interpretation informed by principles of international law. 1 44 The majority's holding centered on a criticism of the sources used by the respondent, claiming that he cited only general principles of international law, rather than those regarding extradition treaties in particular. 14 5 Such criticism seems counterintuitive: if international law in general forbids abductions, it should forbid them, afortiori, in the presence of extradition treaties. Otherwise, extradition treaties would paradoxically decrease the protections provided to nations by international law. Hence, this Note argues that these general principles of international law should be utilized in informing the reading of extradition treaties.
Territorial sovereignty is a basic principle recognized by international law. 146 Furthermore, official abductions constitute violations of territorial sovereignty, and hence are infractions of international law. 14 7 It has even been argued that jurisdiction in the Alvarez-Machain case should have been prohibited, and that Dr. Alvarez-Machain should have been returned to Mexico, based on international law alone, regardless of the Extradition Treaty. 148 Even the majority opinion conceded that "[r]espondent and his amici may be correct that respondent's abduction was ... in violation of general international law principles." 14 9 Given the fact that Mexican government officials were likely familiar with this widely cited doctrine of international law, it was natural for these officials to assume that official abductions would violate the Extradition Treaty. This assumption holds true especially in light of the Treaty's stated goal to have the two nations "cooperate more closely in the fight against crime"' 5 0 and thus provide protections beyond the standard defaults of international law. The majority's position that we should not look at international law principles that apply even in the absence of extradition treaties would seem to imply that extradition treaties actually decrease the protections otherwise given to nations by international law. Such an implication makes a mockery of extradition treaties.
The majority attempted to ridicule the territorial sovereignty argument with the reductio that even though waging war similarly violates territorial sovereignty, it stated that "it cannot be seriously contended [that] an invasion of the United States by Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the two nations."' 15 ' This reductio misses the mark, however, since waging war has no serious connection with the stated purpose of the Treaty to cooperate in the fight against crime. 152 Quite the contrary, abductions of criminals fall precisely under the sphere of issues that would logically be included in the purpose of cooperation in the rendition of criminals. Therefore, it is not a logical extension of the respondent's argument to say that extradition treaties, by implication, prohibit wars. 15 Thus, the territorial sovereignty argument was wrongly rejected by the majority.
In sum, the Treaty's purpose, when viewed in connection with the principles of international law, illustrates that the Treaty implic-Current treaty partners of the United States, and those planning to execute treaties with the United States in the future, should now be on notice that the United States may not carry out its treaty obligations in a trustworthy fashion.' 59 This is truly unfortunate because many nations hold the United States in high esteem. 60 Finally, the core precedent upon which the majority based its holding, Ker v. Illinois, has itself been widely condemned as anachronistic, with many commentators calling for its reversal. 16 ' Rather than reversing Ker as has been widely suggested, or even limiting it,162 the majority actually extended Ker by applying it to the new fact situation of officially, as well as privately, sponsored abductions. Thus, Ker is highly unstable ground upon which to base such a controversial decision.
D. MISGUIDED POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
In abducting and trying Dr. Alvarez-Machain, the Executive Branch, and perhaps even the Supreme Court majority, were likely 159 Perhaps the recent United States presidential election will put an end to this type of conduct, at least temporarily. As then President-elect Clinton stated, "I believe that when another nation is willing to obey the law, and in the absence of information that the government itself has willfully refused to obey the law, that the United States should not be involved in kidnapping." John M. Broder & Paul Richter, Clinton Vows to Seek Trade Pact Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1993, at A14. Note, however, the carefully guarded language Clinton used in condemning official kidnapping. In addition, then President-elect Clinton directly criticized the Supreme Court decision in AlvarezMachain, saying that it "goes way too far." Clinton, High Court Difer on Abduction, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A32. 160 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(noting that motivated, at least in part, by the understandable desire to bring vicious criminals to justice and to curb the illegal drug trade. Indeed, this is not the first Supreme Court decision involving the Camarena murder that has been criticized as being politically motivated.
163
The Executive Branch freely admits that it was at least partially motivated by a vengeful spirit.1 64 While the objectivity of an agency acting under such strong emotional forces is to be questioned, this spirit of vengeance is entirely out of place in the Judicial Branch. While it cannot be stated with certainty that disgust over the Camarena murder influenced the majority in Alvarez-Machain, this is clearly the implicit conclusion drawn by the Justices in the minority opinion. As Justice Stevens noted, the desire to seek revenge should not be used as a "justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has a duty to uphold." 16 5 It is precisely when this desire is strong, Justice Stevens continued, that the Court must be especially careful to render judgment dispassionately.1
66
The wisdom of the revenge policy is also to be questioned as it may backfire on the United States. 16 7 Judge Sofaer warned that the precise justification given by the United States for seizing suspects abroad, namely that the countries in which they are located refuse to extradite them, could similarly be used by other nations against the United States.16 8 Quite possibly, a single judicially approved abduction, as in this case, will lead to a recurring pattern of abductions on July 2, 1992 , at A5 (In the aftermath of the decision, "Mexican officials responded by saying they would tighten restrictions on agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other foreign law enforcement agencies with which they now cooperate.").
168 Prosecution of Terrorists, supra note 113, at 63 ("I want to also add-and I think this is an important underlying comment I have to this bill and this committee-that we, the United States of America, are one of those nations who fail to extradite terrorists.").
See also Brief of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in Support of Affirmance at 5, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 Ct. (1992 Finally, as well-illustrated by the unraveling events in this case, 1 70 a major danger of abductions is that the slipshod manner in which they are often conducted may subject an innocent person to barbaric injustices. With little or no pretrial due process rights afforded to these abductees, and the Supreme Court's permission to grant jurisdiction over them, the Executive Branch is given free reign over such abductions. As one commentator put it, the arguments in favor of abductions of violent criminals are "apt to overlook that among the persons so treated there may be an innocent one. This is a great danger, and... for this reason alone, neither society nor the law must allow a departure from the great principle that no illegality must ever bear fruit." 1 7 ' Indeed, the subsequent history of Alvarez-Machain makes this admonition all too clear. The majority in Alvarez-Machain wrongly decided that the Extradition Treaty with Mexico did not prohibit the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. Had the Court properly held that the Treaty prohibited his abduction, it then should have held that under Rauscher, United States courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain due to the Treaty violation. As the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain was officially sponsored by the United States government, the Court should have distinguished it from Ker, which lacked such official government approval.
Reading the Treaty in light of its purposes, and the understanding of the two countries as to the Treaty's meaning, this Note argues nessman from New York City for trial on a political offense, without any violation of the Extradition Treaty.").
Cf 170 See supra note 25 (noting that the United States District Court for the Central District of California, on remand, dismissed the charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain, upon finding that the prosecution's evidence was wildly speculative). 171 Mann, supra note 92, at 419.
